


HPAI H5N1

A short review of the situation in Europe and Germany

A. Globig, T. Harder, E. Starick, J. Teuffert, F. Conraths,
T. Mettenleiter, M. Beer



Situation of the recent years


- **Before 2005 HPAIV H5N1 Asia has never been detected in Europe**
(exception: smuggled Hawk Eagles from Asia to Brussels)

Situation of the recent years


- Before 2005 HPAIV H5N1 Asia has never been detected in Europe
- In **2005/2006** HPAI H5N1 emerged in **23 European countries,** mainly affecting wild birds with sporadic spill-overs to poultry

HP H5N1 Situation in 2006

23 European Countries, 882 H5N1 positive wild bird samples



Dead and infected wild birds, rates per country




Data source: WAHID Interface 2006

HP H5N1 Situation in 2006

A.M.Kilpatrick et al., PNAS 103 (2006)19368-19373:

Combined data analysis on phylogenetic relationships of virus isolates & migratory bird movement & trade in poultry and wild birds




Migratory birds: most likely for H5N1 spread to 20 / 23 European countries in 2006 (3 exceptions: Romania, Albania, Spain)


Italy, France, Germany: introduction by cold weather-induced movement of wild birds further West was more likely than by trade in wild birds and poultry

HP H5N1 Situation in 2006

Circulation of multiple Qinghai-like H5N1 genotypes in Western Europe



Gall-Reculé et al., Avian Pathol. 2008
 Hoffmann et al., Virus Genes 2008
 Starick et al., Vet. Microbiol. 2008
 Kiss et al., Virol. J. 2008
 Bragstad et al., Virol. J. 2007
 Nagy et al., Vet. Microbiol. 2007



EMA 1

2.2.1

EMA 3




2.2.3

EMA 2

2.2.2



Salzberg et al.,
 EID 2007,

HP H5N1 Situation in 2006 - Germany




Local dispersal of the same virus after introduction

HP H5N1 Situation in 2006 - Germany




Data on ringed waterbirds North vers. South



Situation of the recent years

- Before 2005 HPAIV H5N1 Asia has never been detected in the European Union (EU)
- In 2006 HPAI H5N1 emerged in 23 European Countries, mainly affecting wild birds with sporadic spill-overs to poultry
- **In 2007 HPAI H5N1 occurred in Russia, Hungary and Great Britain; in Czech Republic, France, Germany and Russia; in Romania and Poland - affecting poultry and wild birds on large scale**

HP H5N1 Situation in 2007 - Europe




Subclade 2.2.3
high homologies
with viruses from
Kuwait and Russia

HP H5N1 Situation in 2007 - Europe

- 14 outbreaks in domestic poultry have been reported in six Member States
- Although three countries (Hungary, Germany and the Czech Republic) have also reported cases in wild birds, the timing and location of cases in domestic poultry offered no obvious epidemiological link to wild bird infection in the majority of cases.
- > entry into domestic poultry most probably through trade in poultry products, or via fomites (esp. Hungary-United Kingdom), spill-over to wild birds


HPAIV H5N1 in Germany, 2007



Two outbreak phases:

- **June-August 2007 (mainly wild birds, 2 industrial duck holdings, 1 backyard)**
- **December 2007 (3 backyard chicken holdings)**

HPAI H5N1 in wild birds in Germany, 2007



Black-necked Grebe
Podiceps nigricollis



Great-crested Grebe
Podiceps cristatus



Little Grebe
Podiceps ruficollis



Globig et al., TBED in press N=329; 300 at Lake Berga-Kelbra

HPAI H5N1 in poultry in Germany, 2007


	Date of detection	Federal state	County	Poultry	Size of holding	died
1	06.07.	TH	Saalfeld-Rudolstadt	Ducks, geese	10	1
2	25.08.	A BY	Erlangen-Höchstadt	Fattening ducks	169.857	4.000
3	10.09.	B BY	Hofing/Schwandorf	Fattening ducks	170.856	0
4	15.12.	BB	Oberhavel	Chickens	11	10
5	21.12.	BB	Potsdam Mittelmark	Chickens	30	19
6	25.12.	BB	Ostprignitz	Chickens	15	11

Clinical signs


- **Ducks: None, if aged > 10 days; mortality only in association with opportunistic bacterial/parasitic infections, daily mortality rates below 1,5%**
- **Geese: Neurologic symptoms**
- **Chickens: Apoplectiform deaths, severe depression**

Phylogenetic analysis (HA gene)

Analyses by Minimal Evolution (Mega 4.0, bootstrap values), Maximum Likelihood (TreePuzzle, **bootstrap values**) and Bayesian Estimation (Beast) result in identical topologies.



Reconstruction of HPAIV H5N1 poultry cases

**Brandenburg**

„Feeding“ offal of
christmas ducks
to **chickens**

Bavaria-B

Incursion in June??
Silent spread, no mortality

**Bavaria-A,
Slaughterhouse**

Clinically „overt“ infections in August,
retain samples of slaughter slots from
B tested positive for HP H5N1

Plea for regular, virological duck monitoring


- **High risk of silent circulation in ducks**
- **High risk of spread to gallinaceous poultry where disease becomes visible**
- **Increased risk of spread to workers in duck poultry holdings**
- **Risk of incursion into the food chain**

- **No syndrome surveillance possible (cumulative mortality, opportunistic infections)**
- **Sentinel placement difficult**

Situation of the recent years

- Before 2006 HPAIV H5N1 Asia has never been detected in the European Union (EU)
- In 2006 HPAI H5N1 emerged in 23 European Countries
- In 2007 HPAI H5N1 occurred in Russia, Hungary and Great Britain; in Czech Republic, France, Germany; in Romania and Poland – affecting poultry and wild birds on large scale
- In **2008** HPAIV H5N1 was only sporadically detected from samples from wild birds in GB (Jan/Feb, n=11) and Switzerland (n=1) and in one mixed poultry holding in Germany

HP H5N1 Situation in 2008



HP H5N1 Situation in Germany, 2008

02/10/2008: Monitoring: 30 ducks (1x hp H5N1 positive), 30 geese (negative)
Subsequent slaughter of all ducks (24 hp H5N1 positive)

800 geese*
550 ducks*
60 chicken*
245 turkeys

106 cattle
4 sheep
8 pigs
1 pony
1 donkey

* free range holding



Only ducks were found positive for HPAIV H5N1, no mortality
Source of introduction remains unclear (no cases in radius of 2000 km)

Summary

The 2007/2008 HPAI H5N1 outbreaks represent **new incursions of virus** into Europe, however:

- a) The source remains unknown.
- b) No wild bird reservoir of the virus has been identified.
- c) It is possible that once introduced, wild birds may have spread the virus over short distances.

Conclusions

- The re-emergence of genetically similar viruses in widely distant geographic locations (e.g. Kuwait-Germany-Russia) indicates that clade 2.2 - H5N1 viruses may have become endemic in Central or Eastern Asia (including Siberia, Russia)
- From here they have been repeatedly introduced to Europe, the Middle East and Africa
- Continuous investigation of both, wild birds and poultry will give more insights of the prevalence of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.2 in Europe

J'aimerais vous remercier



pour votre aimable attention


Recommendation of Duck Monitoring

- **Virologic monitoring (rRT-PCR) of all duck holdings > 1000 animals:**

Oropharyngeal/cloacal swabs of 60 dead ducks, taken during a period of three weeks


- **Continuous serologic screening during slaughter-course:**

40 blood samples (slaughter-batch) with cELISA as screening-test.




Mortality rates fattening ducks (Bavaria 2)

Hatched 20.06.2007 (house 5, slaughtered 01.08.2007):
2 HPAIV H5N1-positive samples (isolates available) detected in
frozen retain samples.




Mortality rates fattening ducks (Bavaria 2)

Hatched 29.06.2007 (house 1, slaughtered 11.08.2007):
1 HPAIV H5N1-indiscriminate samples (H5N1 ct 36 non-typable)
detected in frozen retain samples.



Mortality rates fattening ducks (Bavaria 2)

Hatched 25.04.2007 (house 5, slaughtered 14.06.2007): No retain material available.




HP H5N1 Situation in 2006


Most of the 33 domestic poultry outbreaks reported in five affected Member States (Hungary (29), Sweden (1), Germany (1), France (1), Denmark (1)) were preceded by the positive identification of virus in wild birds in the vicinity of the index case

-> strong epidemiological link to the source of infection (spill-over from wild birds)

HPAI H5N1 outbreaks July-Oct 05





Pekingenten 28 Tage, R1959/07 10^3 EID₅₀ HPAIV H5N1 oro-nasale Infektion



Free ranging sentinel chicken 1 day p.i.

Pekingenten 28 Tage, R1959/07 10⁶ EID₅₀ HPAIV H5N1 oro-nasale Infektion






Genomes sequenced in this study are colored according to geographical region:

- Europe
- Africa
- Middle East
- Vietnam

Other isolates of note are colored as follows:

- Human cases
- Vietnam clade V3



Salzberg et al., EID 2007

- **Saisonmästerei (Herbst), handelt nur geschlachtete Tiere**
- **Zukauf im August, mehrfache Umstellungen, kaum Verluste**
- **begrenzter Personenverkehr (im Stallbereich) trotz Vermietung von Ferienwohnungen**
- **Praktikantin aus Tschechien**
- **Krähen an Futterautomaten im Entenauslauf**


- **Keine Hinweise auf H5N1 in Restriktionsgebieten oder Kontakt- (Herkunfts-) betrieben**
- **Kein Virusvorkommen in Hausgeflügel- und Wildvögeln im Umkreis von 2000 km**



Layers – Challenge experiments

10 dpi

**Trial #1
after 1st
vaccination**




**Contact birds die;
2 of 8 vaccinated layers die;
massive virus excretion by
Vaccinated birds**


Layers – Challenge experiments

10 dpi

Trial #1
after 1st
vaccination



Trial #2
after basic
vaccination



**Contact birds die;
vaccinated birds survive;
sporadic virus excretion
by vaccinated birds**

FRIEDRICH-LOEFFLER-INSTITUT


FLI

Bundesforschungsinstitut für Tiergesundheit
Federal Research Institute for Animal Health


Layers – Challenge experiments

10 dpi

Trial #1
after 1st
vaccination



Trial #2
after basic
vaccination



Trial #3
6 months
after
2nd boost



E.coli in 5 of 8 birds

**Contact birds die;
3 of 8 vaccinated layers die;
opport. bacterial infections;
moderate virus excretion
By vaccinated birds**

FRIEDRICH-LOEFFLER-INSTITUT


FLI

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Federal Research Institute for Animal Health


Layers – Challenge experiments

Status	Dead contact birds		Dead vaccinees (n=8)	Virus excretion by vaccinees until day pi	Excretion of infectivity	
	Non-vaccinated (n=5)	Vaccinated (n=5)			Contact birds	Vaccinees
1x vaccinated (21 dpv)	5		2	10	Yes	Yes
2x vaccinated (21 dpv)	5		0	10	Yes	No
2x vaccinated (6 Mo. pv)	5		3	10	Yes	No
2x vaccinated (12 Mo. pv)		0	4	8	No	No
1x re-vaccinated (21 dpv)		0	1	8	No	No
2x vaccinated (18 Mo. pv)		2	5	10	Yes	Yes
1x re-vaccinated (12 Mo. pv)		0	0	10	No	Yes
2x re-vaccinated (6 Mo. pv)		0	1 (n=7)	10	No	No

Geese parents – study plan



Geese parents - Serology



Geese parents – Challenge experiments

Status	Dead contact birds		Dead vaccinees (n=8)	Virus excretion by vaccinees until day pi	Excretion of infectivity	
	Non-vacc. (n=5)	Vacc. (n=5)			Contact birds	Vaccinees
1x vaccinated (21 dpv)	5		0	9	Yes	No
2x vaccinated (21 dpv)	2		0	2	Yes	No
2x vacc. (6 Mo. pv)	1		0	10	Yes	No
2x vacc. (12 Mo. pv)		0	1	10	No	Yes

Fattening ducks




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Fattening ducks – Challenge experiments


**Trial #1
after 1st
vaccination**



10 dpi

None died or got sick, 4 vaccinated ducks shed virus


**Trial #2
after 2nd
vaccination**



10 dpi

None died or got sick, 2 vaccinated ducks shed virus

**Trial #3
6 months
after 2nd
vaccination**



10 dpi

None died or got sick, 1 vaccinated duck shed virus

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AI vaccination in the field

- **Basic immunization** required for full clinical protection (layers)
- **Clinical protection** can be compromised by bacterial co-infections (layers)
- **Reduction of virus excretion** did not prevent transmission of infection of susceptible contacts (layers, geese), but effectively did so for vaccinated contacts (geese)
- **Reduced susceptibility** of semiadult Pekin ducks against challenge strain
- Possible protective effects of **heterologous AI immunity** (H10N4) not clear

AI vaccination in the field

- **AI vaccination recommendable for geese and ducks** in case of high pressure of infection (aids in reduction of virus spread)
- **AI vaccination of layers critical**
(Loss of syndrome surveillance capabilities but no sterile immunity; however: reduction of virus loads aids in reduction of spread)
- High **logistic needs** (costs, time)
- Induction of **homogenous immunity** required